13.7 Threats Out of Scope
The following are explicitly outside what the package manager defends against. Each is a real concern; each is addressed elsewhere.
Compromise of an installing operator's identity. peipkg runs with the operator's authority (§13.1). If that identity is compromised, no format-level defence helps. The kernel's own audit and recovery mechanisms apply.
Side-channel attacks on installed binaries. Speculative-execution, cache-timing, and similar attacks against installed software are the kernel's concern and the software's, not the package format's.
Physical attacks on storage. A physically compromised disk can have its package database or installed files altered offline. Hash verification at use time — outside the package manager — is the appropriate defence.
Compromise of the build farm. A compromised farm can sign malicious packages with trusted keys. Detection requires independent reproducible-build verification (§12.7).
The build farm identifier recorded in each manifest can be constrained per repository as defence in depth — refusing packages from a farm not on a configured allowlist. That is not implemented, and it would protect only against a stale farm whose key was rotated but whose identifier is still recognised, or against an attacker who obtained a key without the farm's operational identity. It is not a format-level guarantee.
Network-level censorship or denial of service preventing package fetching. An operational concern.